Event-tree analysis using binary decision diagrams by J.D. Andrews (7120562) & Sarah J. Dunnett (7119275)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository by the 
author and is made available under the following Creative Commons Licence 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
230 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIALABILITY, VOL. 49, NO. 2, JUNE 2000
Event-Tree Analysis Using Binary Decision Diagrams
John D. Andrews and Sarah J. Dunnett
Abstract—This paper is concerned with ETA (event-tree anal-
ysis) where the branch point event causes are defined using fault
trees. Attention is on the nontrivial situation where there are de-
pendencies amongst the branch point events. The dependencies
are due to component-failures in more than one of the fault trees.
In these situations the analysis methods based on traditional FTA
(fault-tree analysis) are inaccurate & inefficient.
The inaccuracies are not consistent across the outcome events. If
frequency predictions calculated in this way are then used in a risk
assessment then the relative risks would be distorted and could lead
to resources being used inappropriately to reduce the overall risk.
A new approach using BDD (binary decision diagram) is described
which addresses these deficiencies.
Index Terms—Binary decision diagrams, event-tree analysis,
fault-tree analysis, noncoherent systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Acronyms1
F–N plot of cumulative frequency vs number of fa-
talities
BDD binary decision diagram
DBDD dual BDD
BDD BDD for
ETA event-tree analysis
FTA fault-tree analysis
MCS minimal cut set
PI prime implicant
Definitions
Initiator: the potential hazardous trigger event.
Minimal Cut Set: a combination of component failure events
which are necessary & sufficient to cause the top event.
Prime Implicant: a combination of basic events (success or
failure) which is both necessary & sufficient to cause the top
event.
Path Set: a list of working components which, if they occur
at the same time, result in the system working.
ETA is commonly used to identify the consequences that can
result following the occurrence of a potentially hazardous event.
It was first applied in risk assessments [1] for the nuclear in-
dustry but is now used by other industries such as chemical
processing, offshore oil & gas production, and transportation.
Quantification of the event-tree diagram allows the frequency
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1The singular & plural of an acronym are always spelled the same.
of each of the outcomes to be predicted. In a risk study, the
outcome event consequences, usually expressed in terms of fa-
talities, can be combined with the frequency of occurrence to
produce an F–N curve to help assess the acceptability of the re-
sponse to hazards. Event trees are an inductive (forward logic)
technique which examine all possible responses to the initi-
ating event, progressing left to right across the page. The branch
points on the tree structure usually represent the success, failure,
or partial failure of systems & subsystems which can respond to
the initiating event.
FTA is a deductive analysis that can be used in conjunction
with the event tree to identify the causes of the subsystem fail-
ures or branch events. Quantification of the fault tree provides
the probability of passing along each of the event-tree branches.
The methodology used to quantify event trees has changed
very little since the conception of the technique back in the
1960s when it was successfully used in the WASH 1400
study [2]. When the branch point events are -independent
of each other, quantification of the diagram is trivial and is
achieved simply by finding the product of the frequency of
the initiating event with the probabilities of passing along
each branch leading to each outcome scenario. When there are
-dependencies between the branch events then quantifying
the probability of passing along different branch points is
more complex. It is performed by quantifying a fault tree
whose top event is defined as combinations of occurrence and
nonoccurrence of the branch-point events that have in turn been
developed with fault-tree structures. Therefore there is a very
heavy dependence on the efficiency & accuracy of the FTA.
FTA is frequently used for safety-system assessments, and the
majority of computer codes used for these analyzes are based
on the kinetic tree theory [3] formulated in 1970. This theory
uses approximations. Recent work at Loughborough Univer-
sity [4]–[6], Bordeaux University [7]–[9] ,and University of
Virginia [10], [11] has produced a new assessment technique
based on a BDD formulation of the system failure logic. This
approach has advantages in terms of both efficiency & accuracy
over the conventional kinetic tree theory. Since top-event
probabilities can be derived exactly and without the need to
evaluate the MCS or PI as intermediate results, this has major
implications for improving the accuracy & efficiency of ETA.
This paper demonstrates the traditional ETA and compares
this to a BDD based approach. The inadequacies of the ETA are
demonstrated for a very simple system. These inadequacies can
be overcome with the BDD approach. However, the nature of
the worst-case complexity does not change.
A. Notation
number of subsystems
top-event cause ,
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Fig. 1. Gas-leak event-tree.
Fig. 2. Simple event-tree structure.
system failure
frequency of the initiating event
frequency of each event-tree outcome
event-tree outcome ; Boolean expression
top-event Boolean function for
not
OR (for events)
AND (for events)
structure function
outcome events,
consequence associated with
subsystem ,
failure of subsystem
frequency of outcome
risk associated with
II. INDEPENDENT EVENT TREES
Fig. 1 shows a very simple event-tree for an example safety-
system. The initiating event is the release of gas on an offshore
platform. The branch points then consider the success and
failure of the gas detection system, isolation valve subsys-
tems and , and the blowdown valve subsystem in turn. The
outcomes determined by the end point of each event-tree branch
identifies a different consequence following the initiating event.
Fault trees can be constructed to develop the causes of each
of these subsystem failures. If the systems fail -independently
then the event tree quantification is the relatively simple task
of multiplying the “probabilities of passing along each branch
point on any path through the diagram” by the “initiating-event
frequency.” The can be evaluated by quantifying the relevant
fault tree; then gives the probability of passing along the
system-success branch.
Strong -dependencies when
or
for system event following the system event can be incor-
porated in this approach. As shown in Fig. 1, if the gas-detection
system fails then none of the other systems are activated; thus
their availability is irrelevant because the consequence in this
sequence is already determined. This is represented by the line
from the branch representing gas-detection system-failure going
completely across the diagram, indicating that this event alone
determines the outcome.
III. -DEPENDENCIES IN EVENT TREES
The procedure to analyze event trees when there are weak
-dependencies uses the FTA much more heavily. Weak -de-
pendencies occur when basic events representing component
failures appear in more than one of the fault trees which develop
the branch-point causes. In these circumstances the fault trees
representing the relevant system working & failed states need
to be combined as inputs to an AND gate whose output now
determines the causes of a higher level complex event. Boolean
reduction of the combined fault-tree structure produces the com-
binations of basic events which cause the complex-system event
considering the -dependency. Since some of the subsystem
events in the complex event represent system-success, the re-
sulting fault tree is noncoherent [12]. The analysis of nonco-
herent fault trees using the usual analysis of kinetic-tree theory
relies heavily on approximation as detailed in Section VII, and
is at times both inaccurate & inefficient. The BDD approach can
offer advantages in both efficiency & accuracy which becomes
especially important when analyzing very large event-trees such
as those in the nuclear industry.
To demonstrate the advantages of BDD over the conventional
FTA when used to assess an event tree, both techniques are dis-
cussed in relation to the simple event tree in Fig. 2. There are
only 2 subsystems (S1 and S2) which respond to the initiating
event .
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Fig. 3. System fault trees.
The fault trees representing the failure of S1 and S2 are in
Fig. 3(a) and (b), respectively. Because the basic events &
occur in both fault trees, there is a “weak” -dependence be-
tween the subsystem failure events.
Due to the weak -dependencies, the 4 outcomes which can
occur in response to the initiating event are developed as fault
trees with the top-event expressions in (1). The introduction of
the NOT gates in 3 of these structures produces noncoherent
trees. The efficiency & accuracy of the event-tree quantification
then depends upon the efficiency & accuracy of the FTA for
noncoherent fault trees.
(1)
Fig. 4(a) and 4(b) show the dual formulations of the fault trees
representing failure of S1 & S2 [Fig. 3(a) and (b)], respectively.
IV. QUALITATIVE FTA
When NOT logic is introduced to a fault-tree structure, that
structure no longer is nondecreasing; thus its structure function
is noncoherent. Boolean reduction, of the logic function repre-
senting the top event of a coherent fault tree, to a sum-of-prod-
ucts or disjunctive normal form identifies the MCS. When the
fault tree is noncoherent, then the equivalent logic expression
for the top event produces the PI.
When the tree structure is coherent the Boolean reduction
process results in MCS.
From the fault trees representing the causes of the two safety-
system failures [Fig. 3(a) and (b)] in the simple event tree, the
Fig. 4. System success trees.
Boolean expressions (2) & (3) which provide the failure combi-
nations derived for the top event.
(2)
(3)
From the fault trees representing system success [Fig. 4(a) and
4(b)], the top event causes are derived from:
(4)
(5)
V. QUANTITATIVE FTA
Once the are determined, , MCS or PI, then can
be found by evaluating the inclusion-exclusion expansion.
(6)
When the are MCS, this series expression (5) is frequently
approximated by truncating the expansion after the first 1 or 2
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terms or by using an alternate approximation such as the MCS
upper bound:
(7)
For coherent fault trees the truncation of the expansion in
(6) is justified because the terms which account for the simul-
taneous occurrence of higher-order failure combinations have
a rapidly diminishing numerical contribution to the top-event
probability. If the tree is noncoherent and if the are PI, then
the truncation of (6) or the use of approximation (7), might not
be valid, and many terms in the series expansion might need
to be calculated to gain the required accuracy. For large fault
trees, it is beyond the capability of modern computers to eval-
uate the full expansion in any reasonable time. To quantify the
top-event probability, the PI are frequently reduced to their co-
herent approximations by assuming any working states for the
components in the expression are assumed to be TRUE. On the
basis that
component works
the resulting approximations to the MCS are then minimized,
and approximations such as (7) are used.
VI. EVALUATING THE CAUSES OF THE EVENT-TREE OUTCOMES
Identifying the causes of each event-tree outcome, where the
fault trees have weak -dependencies, is equivalent to producing
the Boolean expressions in (1).
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
VII. QUANTIFYING THE FREQUENCY OF THE EVENT-TREE
OUTCOMES
The MCS or PI evaluated during the qualitative FTA are used
along with the probability of each basic event to evaluate all
. For exact results, (7) is used to determine the probability of
the particular responses for S1 & S2. This probability is then
multiplied by the “initiating event frequency” to determine the
frequency of each event-tree outcome.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF EVENT-TREE RESULTS
A. Exact Calculation for Non-Coherent Outcomes
(12)
(13)
(14)
Because this is a very small, simple example, the exact cal-
culations can be performed. When there are several thousand,
perhaps hundreds of thousands, of the MCS or PI, then these cal-
culations cannot be performed. For a coherent fault tree the in-
clusion-exclusion expression (6) converges, and truncation after
the first or second term usually yields a result of acceptable ac-
curacy. Alternatively the MCS upper-bound (7) is a better ap-
proximation (exact when the MCS are -independent).
For noncoherent fault trees, the convergence of the inclusion-
exclusion expansion can be very slow and many terms need to be
evaluated. For large fault trees this is not possible. An alternative
method (frequently used in commercial packages) is to use the
coherent approximation. For the simple example in this section,
the result is:
(15)
(16)
(17)
To provide a numerical comparison of results, and the effects
of the approximations, let:
• each component-failure probability
• /year.
The results are summarized in Table I. Large percentage er-
rors exist even in this relatively small problem.
VIII. BINARY DECISION DIAGRAMS
BDD provide an alternative logic form to the fault-tree
structure to express the system failure causes. BDD encodes
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Fig. 5. Structures for system-A fault tree.
a Shannon form of the structure function; thus the exact
system failure can be deduced without the need to resort
to any approximations. BDD has the additional advantages
that its quantification does not require the MCS & PI to be
determined as an intermediate stage, and that it improves the
accuracy & efficiency. However, nothing comes without cost
and, for BDD, the cost is the effort expended converting from a
fault-tree structure to the BDD. Previous work [8] investigating
the relative efficiency of the conventional FTA and BDD
approaches has shown that orders of magnitude reduction in
computer processing time for large fault trees can be achieved.
This improvement is anticipated to be even more important for
noncoherent fault trees which tend to produce a vast number of
system failure modes which include component success states
(PI).
Fig. 5(a) shows the BDD SYS1 structure for the fault tree
in Fig. 3(a). BDD construction requires the basic events to be
ordered. For this SYS1 example, the order is .
Rules for the fault tree to BDD conversion process are covered
extensively in [5], [8].
The diagram features a root vertex placed at the top of the tree
structure. Each vertex (node) represents a basic event from the
fault tree and has two paths which leave the node, a 1 branch and
a 0 branch, which indicate the occurrence (failure) and nonoc-
currence of the basic event respectively. Paths through the BDD
terminate at one of two types of terminal node, labeled 1 and
0. Paths which lead to a terminal-1 node specify the conditions
for the fault-tree top event to occur: . Listing just the
failure events on such a path is equivalent to producing the cut
sets for the fault tree. Unless the selected basic-event ordering
has produced a minimal-form BDD, the cut sets will have to be
processed to remove redundancies and produce the MCS. There
is a procedure to transform the BDD to encode only MCS [8].
While this is an important source of information to the analyst
it is not needed to evaluate the event-tree outcome frequencies.
Conversely, paths terminating in a 0 terminal-node represent the
top event nonoccurrence.
Tracing the paths through the BDD in Fig. 5 produces cut
sets: , , , .
Removing the redundant cut-set results in the extraction of
the third combination from the list, leaving the 3 MCS obtained
in (2).
Due to the binary branching, each path in the BDD is mutu-
ally exclusive; thus the system failure is obtained by sum-
ming the each disjoint path leading to a terminal-1 node .
each disjoint path is the likelihood of the combination of
the basic events (success & failure) represented by the path.
IX. DUAL FORMULATION USING THE BDD
A feature of BDD is the ease with which the dual can be for-
mulated. The primary BDD represents . The dual function
is:
(18)
The dual BDD represents ; it is created by changing the ter-
minal 1’s to terminal 0’s and vice-versa. (In this formulation of
the dual, the nodes on the BDD still represent component-failure
states.) Applying these rules to the BDD illustrated in Fig. 5(a)
gives the dual in Fig. 5(b).
The path through the dual BDD to a terminal 1 which in-
cludes each node passed through on the 0 branch (working com-
ponents) represents the path sets of the fault tree.
The path sets for the BDD shown in Fig. 5(b) are:
These path sets are also minimal, and agree with those produced
by the conventional analysis method (4). The transformation be-
tween primal and dual is very efficient.
X. EVENT-TREE OUTCOMES
Using BDD to analyze the outcomes of the event-tree in Fig. 2
requires the BDD and dual formulation for the fault trees in
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Fig. 6. Structures for system-B fault tree.
Fig. 3(a) and (b). Fig. 5(a) and (b) contain the BDD and DBDD
for the fault tree in Fig. 3(a). For the fault tree in Fig. 3(b),
the equivalent BDD is illustrated in Fig. 6(a) and its DBDD in
Fig. 6(b). The variable ordering, , has
been assumed.
Using the rules to manipulate these structures, the BDD
which represent the causes of each outcome for
can be produced. Fig. 7 gives these along with the implicant
paths derived from the BDD and their likelihood of occurrence;
the implicant paths are shown with the probability in paren-
theses. The likelihoods derived from the BDD agree with those
calculated using the exact method of a full expansion of the
inclusion-exclusion series. Thus confirming the advantage of
using the BDD.
XI. ETA ALGORITHM
The calculations in section 10 show that using a BDD
structure to evaluate the likelihood of event-tree outcomes
when weak -dependencies exist is both accurate and efficient.
It is only desirable to construct the combined BDD when such
-dependencies are encountered. For -independent sections,
only the product of the probabilities is required. The algorithm
in this section quantifies a general event-tree structure with
both weak & strong -dependencies. The event-tree structure
must be drawn to account for the strong -dependencies. The
event-tree has , resulting in & . Each path through the
event-tree diagram leading to an considers the functionality
or failure of all . Fault trees have been constructed to repre-
sent the cause of each subsystem failure. Component failures
are repeated in of the fault trees, providing weakly
-dependent and -independent fault-tree structures.
Algorithm
1. Scan each of the fault trees.
If the fault tree is -independent of all
other fault trees,
Then enter its label in set ;
Else place its label in set .
2. Convert all of the fault trees to
their .
3. For each of the entries in set
, use the relevant BDD to evaluate the
, .
4. For each of the entries in set ,
formulate and store the , .
5. Set
a. Over each path leading to , con-
sider each branch point on the path from
the initiating event.
If (the branch point label )
Then
If branch-point represents subsystem
functionality
Then ,
Else ,
End_If
Else
If (branch point represents subsystem
functionality)
Then place in the dual set
Else place in the primal set
End_If
End_If
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Fig. 7. BDD for various outcomes.
b. Construct the overall -dependency
BDD for:
Calculate using the newly formed BDD.
c. Calculate
d. Calculate
End_Algorithm
XII. EXAMPLE
Leak-Detection System On An Offshore Structure
As an example application of the analysis procedure in Sec-
tion XI, consider the gas-leak system event-tree in Fig. 1. It is a
simplified system taken from an offshore oil & gas production
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Fig. 8. Gas-leak system fault-trees.
TABLE II
EVENT-TREE s-DEPENDENT-PATH PROBABILITIES
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platform. In the event of a loss of containment on the gas sec-
tion, then the detection system should function to identify the
event occurrence. The isolation & blowdown systems are then
triggered, the isolation system closes valves & to ensure
the potential escape inventory is limited. Blowdown valves then
open to de-pressurize the sections safely by allowing the gas to
be flared. Fig. 8 has simplified fault trees showing the causes of
failure of the gas detection, isolation, and blowdown systems.
The fault trees feature the important characteristics of a full
study and can be used to demonstrate the validity of the method
for a complete analysis. As indicated on the event tree, the iso-
lation & blowdown system strongly -depend on the gas-detec-
tion system. Also there is a weak -dependency, failure of the
relay contacts RC1, common to 3 of the fault trees; 2 other such
-dependencies representing solenoid failures, are common to
the isolation-valve fault trees.
To obtain realistic orders of magnitude for the failure proba-
bilities in the fault trees, each basic event is assigned an avail-
ability of 95%.
The Algorithm (in Section XI) places the detection system
into set and the remaining systems into set . Complications
arise when considering the outcome probabilities of the “routes
through the event-tree which have -dependencies” (outcomes
1–8 in Fig. 2). Table II, column 3, shows the results from the
Algorithm for these event probabilities. Having considered the
-dependencies, the final frequency of occurrence for each
outcome, 1–8, are obtained by multiplying the probabilities in
Table II by detection system works , , and
the initiating event frequency. To compare with conventional
techniques, an analysis using coherent approximations has
been performed; the results are in Table II, column 5; the MCS
are listed in column 4. The error in the approximate approach
ranges from 10.7% to 23.4% for the noncoherent outcomes.
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